



Standing & Select Committees on Finance Public Hearings 2 March 2022

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#### 23 FEB **7** Estimates of Revenue Estimates of Estimates of Contingency CREDIBLE ITO FISCAL FRAMEWORK **Reserve for** infrastructure) emergencies S42, 77, 214 3 & 215 **BUDGET 2022 FISCAL** Constitution **FRAMEWORK** S8(4) – Money Bills Amendment Procedure & **Related Matters Act** Estimates of Estimates of Contingent Borrowing liabilities Estimates of Interest & debt service costs Section 42. (3) The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public A SAICA DIFFERENCE MAKERS<sup>™</sup> consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive action.

BUDGET

### **COMMITTEE MANDATE & FISCAL FRAMEWORK**

# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. The accountability and credibility of macro economic and fiscal policy framework is with Parliament as the Constitutional oversight body. Is it <u>meeting that mandate</u>?
- 2. Is Parliament comfortable that it is meeting its mandate of <u>holding the Executive to account</u> on behalf of the people?



## ESTIMATES OF REVENUE



**01** Tax-to-GDP ratio - Methodology

- **O2** Tax-to-GDP ratio Ceiling
- **03** Funding for SARS



### ESTIMATES OF REVENUE



#### BUDGET 23 FEB 🔈 **Tax to GDP 2022** Net tax revenue Χ (Gross tax revenue minus 24.7% SACU payments) ADD: SACU Х ADD: UIF Х ADD: RAF Х ADD: COID Х **ADD:** Provincial Х taxes TOTAL **/**XX 27.6% /GPD % Actual tax extraction

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# Question Parliament needs to ask itself:

1. Is the current tax-to-GDP calculation <u>methodology</u> used by National Treasury <u>appropriate</u> to inform Parliament of the impact on the macro-economic and fiscal policies?



## ESTIMATES OF REVENUE



TAX TO GDP RATIO - Ceiling

Katz Commission Report into Taxation

4. TOWARDS A GUIDING FRAMEWORK - CHAPTER 2

#### RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KATZ REPORT

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JSCOF:

The recommendations 2.8.1 to 2.8.4 are broadly supported with the addition that:

\* the impact on the wider economy of maintaining a tax level of 25% of GDP, and how this figure was determined, be investigated;

\* that while welcoming the fixing of a ceiling for the tax burden as a percentage of **GDP**, further evaluation be done of the 25% rate set, and the economic implications of higher or lower rates;

2.8.1 The commitment of the Government to avoiding increases in the present percentage of national and provincial tax revenue to GDP of about 25% is supported [para. 2.3.9.]





# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Has any <u>further research</u> been done as requested by JSCoF on the <u>level at which</u> <u>high taxes</u> become <u>detrimental</u> to the economy?
- 2. If not, why not?
- 3. Does the Committee <u>agree that there is a</u> <u>level</u> at which <u>high taxes become</u> <u>detrimental</u> to the economy and if so, are we/have we been breaching it under the current fiscal policy?



### ESTIMATES OF REVENUE

# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022

#### **REVENUE ESTIMATES**

#### Table 3.3 Revised gross tax revenue projections

R million	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25
Revised estimate	1 249 711	1 547 071	1 598 447	1 694 259	1 807 614
Buoyancy	3.69	1.93	1.09	1.06	1.06
2021 MTBPS	1 249 711	1 485 415	1 527 412	1 608 006	1 715 258
Elasticity	3.69	1.73	0.99	0.97	1.05
2021 Budget	1 212 206	1 365 124	1 457 653	1 548 512	
Elasticity	2.39	1.44	1.15	1.07	

#### Table 1.1 Macroeconomic outlook – summary

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Real percentage growth	Estimate		Forecast	
Real GDP growth	4.8	2.1	1.6	1.7

Trend of over-estimating revenue & economic growth (Refer also to SAICA's 2019 Budget submission)





Where is the revenue going to come from? Increased tax rates? Will this deliver less tax, as has been the case recently?





# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Are the <u>numbers</u> presented a <u>reasonable</u> <u>estimation</u> of future fiscal revenues given the <u>historical trends of overestimation</u> and declining economic factors?
- 2. <u>Where is the additional tax revenue going to</u> <u>come from (tax increases despite a shrinking</u> economy)?
- 3. Should it come <u>from tax increases</u>, is Parliament comfortable with this considering the current <u>small tax base</u>, <u>economic conditions</u> and <u>reducing</u> <u>returns on tax rate increases</u>?



## ESTIMATES OF REVENUE

# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022

#### FUNDING FOR MANDATE **FUNDING FOR SARS** Insufficient funds (R9bn over 3 **GRAP** implementation? NT will years requested) continue to engage **SARS SERVICE DELIVERY** ARS Compliance behaviour affected Increasing taxpayer complaints & **SARS** dissatisfaction and compliance costs increase SARS electronic systems **REVIEW OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE** Continued lack of Nugent recommendations almost No public consultations to date accountability & oversight implemented





# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Does SARS have <u>sufficient resources</u> to meet the optimistic revenue forecasts so it can target non-compliant taxpayers & ensure acceptable service delivery to compliant taxpayers, so as not to affect their tax compliance behaviour?
- 2. What is the progress on the implementation of GRAP adopted in 2012 by ASB, considering the concerns with the current reporting framework and is the delay in its implementation acceptable to you?
- 3. Given SARS' necessary draconian powers and the outcome of the Nugent Commission, is Parliament <u>satisfied</u> with its <u>level of oversight over SARS' service</u> <u>delivery</u> and treatment of taxpayers?



# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022

- **O1 Expenditure ceilings**
- **O2** Pre-spending of next year's budget
- **O3 Unbudgeted expenditure**
- **O4** Use of the Contingency Reserve
- **05 VIP protection for politicians**



# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022

Expenditure ceilings

#### Table 3.5 Main budget expenditure ceiling

R million	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25
2019 MTBPS	1 307 235	1 404 675	1 493 029	1 591 287	1 673 601		
2020 Budget Review	1 307 119	1 409 244	1 457 703	1 538 590	1 605 098		
2020 MTBPS	1 307 112	1 418 408	1 502 867	1 479 709	1 516 052	1 529 585	
2021 Budget Review		1 418 399	1 504 656	1 514 934	1 521 721	1 530 664	
2021 MTBPS		1 418 456	1 487 399	1 570 890	1 552 268	1 558 725	1 627 154
2022 Budget			1 487 399	1 575 002	1 630 905	1 613 671	1 686 932

Source: National Treasury

Effectiveness of ceilings and credibility of budget process?





# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Are <u>consistent breaches</u> of expenditure ceilings <u>acceptable</u>?
- 2. Is the <u>budget credible</u> considering these consistent breaches?
- 3. If not, <u>what is Parliament going to do</u> about it given its oversight role?



#### **Auditor General Report**

Key financial health indicators at departments – sustainability

Indicators	2020-21	
Sustainability		
Deficit (expenditure exceeded revenue)	R41,74 billion	
Number of departments with deficit	32% (50)	
Cash shortfall (bank overdraft less prepaid expenses/advances plus money to be surendered to treasury)	R33,29 billion	
Number of departments with cash shortfall	61% (89)	
>10% of following year's budget (excluding employee cost and transers)	18% (27)	
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Bank in overdraft	19% (30)	
Estimated settlement value of claims against the state at year-end	R166,07 billion	
Number of departments with unsettled claims	94% (138)	
Claims settlement value >10% of following year's budget (excluding employee cost and transfers)	37% (55)	



Pre-spending on next year's

budget

Departments/Municipalities will start their 2021/22 financial year with a part of their budgets effectively pre-spent











# Question Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Is the Budget credible given <u>extent of</u> <u>pre-spending</u> i.e. is this money "hidden" somewhere else or <u>will</u> <u>service delivery</u> budgeted for <u>not</u> <u>happen?</u>
- 2. Is <u>allocating more resources</u> to these Departments/Municipalities that have <u>not consistently</u> operated within their budgets <u>acceptable</u>?





Unbudgeted expenditure



# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022





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# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Is the budget <u>credible without</u> considering <u>these expenses</u>?
- 2. How will the promised appointment of <u>12 000 additional police officers</u> be <u>funded</u> if after adjusting for inflation the police will have a lower budget in 2025 than in 2022?



# BUDGET 23 FEB **2**

#### **VIP** Protection

#### onal Prosecuting Authority

Provide a coordinated prosecuting service that ensures that justice is delivered to victims of crime through general and specialised prosecutions. Remove profit from crime. Protect certain witnesses.

#### Of which

Departmental agencies and accounts

- Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority: Operations



5 Protection and Security Services Provide protection and security services to all identified dignitaries and government interests.



#### **Ouestion Parliament needs to ask itself:**

- Is Parliament aware of what the 1. 2022 Budget amount is for this unit?
- 2. Are the interest of the people of the country being met by approving this expenditure for a handful of "dignitaries" at nearly same level as NPA that must ensure justice for 60 million people?

What does this tell the people of Parliament's view on equality and service?





#### Contingency Reserve

Used as a "suspense account" for foreseen expenditure rather than for unforeseen emergencies (natural disasters/pandemics etc.)





Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- Is Parliament <u>satisfied</u> with the <u>current use</u> of the Contingency Reserve?
- 2. If so, <u>where will the</u> <u>funds come from</u> for the unforeseen <u>emergencies</u> when we spend it on foreseen short-term matters?



# ESTIMATES OF BORROWING

# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022



Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Are debt level <u>estimates accurate</u> considering concerns with these 3 items?
- Given <u>historical inability</u> of government <u>to keep to</u> expenditure/debt <u>levels</u> why does Parliament believe these estimates are credible?



Question Parliament needs to ask itself:

 Does the budget adequately reflect the <u>impact of the war</u> on foreign debt services costs & inflation (and other expenditure items)?



## **OVERSIGHT & ACCOUNTABILITY**

# BUDGET 23 FEB 2022







# **OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Is the Budget credible? Is it accurate and implementable?

Audit findings and serious/persistent noncompliance (s216(2) Constitution) 2021



## BUDGET 23 FEB 2022

Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- Were <u>those in charge of</u> these entities <u>held</u> <u>accountable</u>? Does Parliament know the answers to this?
  - Is Parliament satisfied that the <u>National Treasury</u> has been sufficiently <u>implementing its s216</u> <u>obligation</u> on Treasury Controls to prevent prespending of budgets and <u>pure disregard for financial</u> <u>management</u> in many government entities?



2.

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# Questions Parliament needs to ask itself:

- 1. Is Parliament <u>using its enforcement rights</u> by amending budgets to ensure that the <u>Executive is held accountable</u> for <u>fiscal</u> <u>discipline failures</u> and maintain economic unity?
- 2. Has Parliament <u>adequately interrogated</u> the Budget and its <u>assumptions</u> to ensure that its outcomes will realise?
- 3. Is <u>Parliament's credibility at risk</u> if the above has not been done?



